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Might v. Right: Charles Taylor and the Sierra Leone Special Court
by K a th y Wa rd

I

N JUNE 2003, THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE
(Special Court) announced it had indicted Liberian President
Charles Taylor on war crimes charges related to his role in the
war in Sierra Leone. The announcement came just as Taylor
arrived in Ghana for peace talks, which diplomats hoped would bring a
quick end to the Liberian war and would provide Taylor with a graceful
exit from power. When news of the indictment broke, Taylor rushed
back to Liberia to avoid the possibility of arrest in Ghana. Although the
peace talks quickly resumed without Taylor, accusations flew that the
C o u rt had ruined the best chance for quick peace in Liberia. A maelstrom of conflicting reports and opinions left many confused as to
whether the indictment was separate from or a part of larger political
efforts to re m ove Taylor.
Now officially in exile in Nigeria, Taylor—a successful coup leader,
fugitive from justice in the U.S., and winner of dubious presidential elections in Liberia—now hopes to evade the Court, where he faces serious
charges related to his connections with rebels in Sierra Leone. Despite
the political effects of the indictment, the indictment is the act of an
authorized criminal investigator and the product of efforts to bring the
rule of law to bear on those most responsible for the horrors of the Sierra
Leone civil war. While Charles Taylor has temporarily eluded the reach
of the Court, this article discusses how he came to be in his present situation and the ways in which legal proceedings and political efforts have
and will continue to interact in the future.

series of economic measures imposed by the Security Council. These
measures included an arms embargo, diamond embargo, and a travel ban
against Taylor and other members of his inner circle. The hope was that
these measures would strangle the flow of arms that fueled Taylor’s milit a ry activities in the region, and that the diamond and travel bans would
limit his funding and force him to stop fueling rebel wars in neighboring
countries. Unfortunately, the arms embargo was never fully enforced,
diamond smuggling continued, other sources of Taylor’s income
remained untouched, and the fighting persisted.
While international frustration with Taylor grew, the Sierra Leone
Special Court began its work by setting up its operations in record time
and announcing indictments that clarified the Prosecutor’s intent to
indict the most senior leadership of all parties responsible for the atrocities in the Sierra Leone war. While the earliest indictments were of Sierra
Leonean citizens, the Court’s mandate granted it broader indictment
powers. Prosecutor David Crane, through statements and the early
indictments, started accusing Taylor of being the center point of a joint
criminal enterprise.
At the same time, governments of neighboring countries explored
other means of removing Taylor. Following Taylor's practice of supporting rebel movements abroad to destabilize neighboring governments,
Taylor’s opponents backed two Liberian rebel groups in their campaigns
to oust Taylor. The largest rebel gro u p, Liberians United for
Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), received support from Guinea,
which eventually allowed it to reach the outskirts of the Liberian capital
of Monrovia. There was also significant evidence that Sierra Leone provided assistance to LURD and speculation that the United States had
provided some form of support as well. The smaller Liberian rebel group,
the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), found backing in
Cote d’Ivoire and eventually took control of significant stretches of
Liberia, including the second city of Buchanan. These campaigns greatly reduced Taylor’s control over the country, effectively restricting his firm
grasp to little more than Monrovia. By the middle of this year, LURD
forces were regularly threatening the capital area itself.

THE SETTING: THE WAR IN SIERRA LEONE, THE CREATION
OF THE SPECIAL COURT AND THE RISING RECOGNITION OF
CHARLES TAYLOR’S ROLE
THE WARS OF THE SMALLER NATIONS of West Africa normally do not
attract much international attention. An earlier incarnation of the
Liberian civil war in the early 1990s led to a West African peacekeeping
force that later conve rted into a UN peacekeeping force. But it was not
until the media bombarded the international community with images of
civilian victims of the Sierra Leone rebels’ amputation campaigns that
leadership beyond West Africa began to invest significant time and
resources to resolve the region’s conflicts. The UN Security Council
approved a significant peacekeeping force for Sierra Leone. When it
failed, Britain stepped in with its own forces to restore stability and to
give the UN force a second life. Notably, these events led world leaders
to conclude that there could be no lasting peace for Sierra Leone without
a means of bringing those to justice most responsible for the atrocities in
the civil war. Looking to create a court that would achieve this mission
and provide international legitimacy without the bureaucracy of the ad
hoc tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, the Security
Council approved the creation of a hybrid Special Court. This Court
would combine international and Sierra Leonean staff and rely on volunt a ry funding to fulfill its mandate to “prosecute persons who bear the
greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone
since 30 November 1996.”
At about the same time the UN Security Council began to take
serious action on the war in Sierra Leone, some Council members also
turned their attention to Liberia. Growing recognition that Taylor and
his regime lay at the heart of the widening spiral of fighting in the region
developed into a movement to confront him. The initial result was a

Liberian refugees, displaced by the violence of Charles Taylor and others.
Credit: Tim Curry
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Taylor, howe ve r, continued to demonstrate a keen ability to survive
through a tight grip on political power, sanctions busting, and a series of
convenient alliances. It remained unclear whether the rebel movements
would unseat him. Moreover, many members of the international community worried that a military victory by either rebel party would not
bring Liberia real peace and a better government. Seizing on Taylor’s
weakened position, regional and Western diplomats, including those
from the United States, launched intensified efforts to reinvigorate the
Liberian peace process. During the year diplomats found glimmers of
hope in re p o rted plans by Taylor to commit to the peace process and to
address serious problems in Liberian governance, including security sector reform. Combined with the added pressure from the rebel military
campaigns, international diplomats built arrangements for a new round
of peace talks involving all the major parties. By June, the stage was set
for top-level negotiations in Accra, Ghana. West African leaders and U.S.
diplomats undertook a concerted campaign to convince Taylor to personally participate in the Accra talks. Taylor agreed. Some diplomats considered the Accra talks the best chance in years to create a peaceable, durable
solution for Liberia that could also remove Taylor by allowing him a
graceful exit from the presidency as part of a negotiated settlement.

The Special Court does not have its own police force to enforce its
arrest warrants. It also does not have a mandate under Chapter VII of
the United Nations Chart e r, meaning that it cannot rely on its mandate
to compel governments to arrest indictees wanted by the court .
Therefore, the Special Court is largely reliant upon the good will of governments to execute its arrest warrants.
The prosecutor of the Special Court, like his Rwanda and former
Yugoslav counterparts, has the power to keep an approved indictment
“sealed.” Ap p roved indictments may be kept under wraps if, for example, the prosecutor believes public knowledge of the indictment could
significantly undermine the likelihood of obtaining custody of the
indictee. This was the case in Taylor’s indictment. As presiding judge of
the Special Court Trial Chamber, Judge Bankole Thompson signed
Taylor’s indictment on Ma rch 3, 2003 and his arrest (and transfer) warrant on Ma rch 7, 2003. The Court kept the indictment sealed, explaining later that because Taylor was a sitting head of state and the subject of
a United Nations Security Council travel ban, it waited for one of
Taylor’s infrequent known trips out of Liberia in the hope that the country he visited would assist the Court in executing the warrant.
The prosecutor believed that the June peace talks in Accra created
that opport u n i t y. As part of a larger study of the Special Court, the
International Crisis Group learned the following facts:
The Court gave 24 hours’ notice to diplomatic missions and UN
security in Monrovia, that the Prosecutor intended to announce
the Taylor indictment when it was clear that he was traveling to
Accra. In a June 4 press release, the Court’s Registrar stated that
“copies of all the relevant documents were served this morning personally on the Ghanaian High Commissioner in Freetown. In
addition, copies of those documents were electronically transmitted to the Ghanaian Mi n i s t ryof Foreign Affairs and acknowledgement of receipt of those documents has been received by telephone
f rom a senior official in that ministry.
That same day, a Ghanaian Foreign Mi n i s t ry official denied receiving
any documents relating to the arrest warrant. The Court said it did not
notify Ghana earlier because it could not be certain officials would not
warn Taylor.
It is important to note that this is not the first time an international court has indicted an individual for war crimes committed as a sitting
head of state. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) established this precedent when it indicted Slobodan
Milosevic, who now stands on trial in The Hague on war crimes charges.
The ICTY statue expressly states that “The official position of any
accused person, whether as Head of State or Government or as a re s p o nsible Government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal
responsibility nor mitigate punishment.” The Special Court’s statute
includes a similar provision that is even clearer: “The official position of
any accused persons, whether as Head of State or Government or as a
responsible government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal
responsibility nor mitigate punishment.”
The situation around the release of the Taylor indictment was even
more complicated. There was substantial evidence that Western diplomats also helped convince Taylor to attend the Accra peace talks and
pressed Ghana to guarantee his immunity. The prosecutor, rightly, was
not part of this process. Thus, by the time Taylor boarded a plane to
Accra, the political and legal processes had competing demands. The
political process wanted Taylor free and protected so he could participate
in the talks that the diplomats hoped would bring peace to Liberia.
While the Special Court wanted him seized during this unusual trip out
of the country and saw the trip as perhaps the only chance it would have
to secure help in obtaining custody of Taylor. However, it is also impor-

THE INDICTMENT
AS MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC WORK HEATED UP, so did the
Prosecutor’s work at the Sierra Leone Special Court. By early 2003, the
C o u rt had already announced the indictments of senior leaders of both
rebel and pro - g overnment groups in Sierra Leone. Taylor loomed as an
un-indicted kingpin in the rebel network, yet Prosecutor Cr a n e ' s
repeated on-the-record statements made his interest in Taylor unmistakable. Taylor’s potential indictment was also discussed in off-therecord meetings.
THE INDICTMENT PROCESS

OF THE

SPECIAL COURT

The Special Court’s indictment process is like that of the ad hoc
international tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. The
Prosecutor conducts investigations of possible indictees. If he or she
determines there is “sufficient evidence to provide reasonable gro u n d s
for believing that the suspect has committed a crime [within the Court’s
jurisdiction],” he or she may prepare an indictment. The prosecutor
then assembles the outline of the case into a proposed indictment and
submits the draft indictment to the presiding trial judge for review. The
prosecutor also submits a proposed arrest warrant. The presiding judge
then decides whether to approve the indictment and warrant. There is
intentionally no role for politicians in the process. Similarly, the power
to request an amendment subsequent to an approved indictment rests
solely with the prosecutor.
In defining the responsibility of the prosecutor, the Statute of the
Special Court specifically states, “[h]e or she shall not seek or receive
instructions from any Government or from any other source.” In other
words, while its work may have political effects, the task of the prosecutor of the Special Court is a legal one and is limited to events in the Sierra
Leone war. The prosecutor does not have the authority to alter his other
actions based on the dictates of politicians involved in diplomatic effort s
to bring lasting peace to Liberia. Similarly, diplomats do not have the
authority to order indictments or cut deals with indictees to remove or
reduce the charges against them. That authority rests with the Court and
particularly with the prosecutor. This separation of authorities—and the
insulation of the criminal legal process from the vagaries of politics—is
a critical component to ensure the trials resulting in verdicts will help
move Sierra Leone from a cycle of violence to a more stable environment
in which law provides an alternative to gun barrel justice.
9

Ward: Might v. Right: Charles Taylor and the Sierra Leone Special Court

Might v. Right
The deal also leaves the Government of Nigeria with a distasteful
houseguest that many Nigerians would rather not have in their country.
Palpable tension remains between Taylor and many Nigerians who still
hold him responsible for the deaths of Nigerian peacekeepers the last
time Nigeria intervened to stop fighting in Liberia. Now, the Nigerian
government is pre vented by Taylor's immunity from bringing charges
related to those deaths and is stuck defending Taylor’s ve ry comfort a b l e
life in a villa in Nigeria free from fear of prosecution.

tant to remember that on a deeper level both processes had the common
goal of removing Taylor from power. While some diplomats apparently
dismissed the Taylor indictment as naïve, the common goal remained.
In the end, the Ghanaians did not detain Taylor and instead allowed
him to return to Liberia. The fighting continued and the humanitarian
crisis worsened until a new round of diplomatic and military efforts eventually led to a deal in which Taylor went into exile in Nigeria. The details
of the exile agreement were not made public, although they are generally taken to include a ban on Taylor participating in the governance of
Liberia while in exile. Some Nigerian officials publicly declared that part
of the deal was that the international community would not press the
government of Nigeria to turn Taylor over to the Special Court .
Some analysts believe the way in which the indictment was
unsealed prolonged the war. They think Taylor really was ready to give
up power and keep his promises, despite his long track re c o rd of lying
and clinging to power through any means. Others disagree, citing that
same track re c o rd (and now Taylor’s subsequent behavior in exile), as evidence that the Accra talks were not likely to produce the results the
diplomats sought.

WHAT DOES THE STATUS QUO MEAN?
TAYLOR WENT INTO EXILE, a rocky form of peace has been

SINCE
established in parts of Liberia. Vice president Moses Blah has taken over
the presidency and is the caretaker of the government until a longer-term
transitional government takes over later this ye a r. West African troops
have established a level of control over Mo n rovia, although most of the
c o u n t ry remains beyond their reach and there is evidence of continued
fighting. The UN Security Council has passed a resolution authorizing
a UN mission in Liberia, including the deployment of up to 15,000 UN
peacekeepers. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has appointed Jacques
Klein to run this UN operation. Klein held a number of international
leadership positions in the Balkans, including serving as the UN
Secretary-General’s Special Representative and Coordinator of UN
Operations in Bosnia. Klein appears ready to use the strong leadership
style he honed in the Balkans to take control of the UN mission and to
bring about stability and progress as quickly as possible.
Dealing with Charles Taylor is a critical part of Klein’s vision of stability. The media has re p o rted that Taylor has been trying to keep his
hand in Liberian affairs—including the running of the government—
f rom his exile in Nigeria. This led Nigerian President Obasanjo to speak
to Taylor in mid-September, warning him that these activities must stop.
At the same time, Klein has called Taylor’s continued presence at large a
threat to peace in Liberia and has already started to press for his turnover
to the Special Court .
That Taylor has continued to interfere in Liberia despite his pro mises and his exile deal should come as no surprise. His personal history
of lying and clinging to power would have made a complete break
unlikely. Moreove r, he operates in an environment where pledges and
laws have had little success at truly controlling the actions of political
and military leaders. The rule of law has had very limited influence in
this environment.
In short, the continuation of the current status quo promises to
have a negative effect on both Liberia and Sierra Leone. It leaves at large
the man most responsible for the Liberian crisis and it leaves him beyond
the reach of the Special Court. It sends a message to Sierra Leoneans that
the rule of law does not apply to those who wield the most control and
the perception that accountability is only for underlings. It also leaves the
people of Liberia with the impression that yet another corrupt Liberian
leader is beyond the reach of the laws of Liberia and the laws of the international community. This impression undermines the rule of law.

These Liberian refugees may be able to re t u rn if Charles Taylor is prevented from
instigating further violence in Liberia.
Credit: Tim Cu r ry

Finally, the current situation sends a potentially dangerous message
to others who might consider leadership by thuggery in Liberia. The lesson is that if you are bad enough and powerful enough, you can ignore
the law and negotiate a comfortable exile. It is perhaps too early to tell
what effect this will have on "little Taylors"—people who would choose
to ignore the law in Liberia on a smaller scale. With a largely destroye d
justice system disrespected throughout the Taylor regime, there seems little doubt that the rule of law faces an uphill battle in Liberia, not to mention that Taylor’s current situation does little to encourage good behavior
by others.

TAYLOR BEHIND BARS: CAN THE STATUS QUO BE
CHANGED?
MANY ANALYSTS HAVE ASKED if things could have gone differently
when Taylor went to Ghana in June. Had Kofi Annan intervened—we a ring his dual hats as UN Secretary-General and as a respected Ghanaian—
perhaps Ghana would have detained Taylor. Howe ve r, as ICG fairly
noted, it probably would not have resulted in an arrest. Strong links of
solidarity and brotherhood among West African heads of state meant
that one West African president would not easily hand another over to
the Special Court .
Gi ven Taylor’s behavior in Nigeria, the deal with him should be
considered null and void. It is hard to imagine how Taylor’s interference
f rom exile in the governance of Liberia could be anything but a violation
of the first order. The whole point of his exile was to take him out of the
10
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picture in Liberia. Nigeria and others involved in the deal may feel they
are in an awkward position now. But they should not feel that way.
Taylor’s behavior, by any rules of agreement, releases them from any
obligations they made to shield him from the Court. In fact, they should
see Taylor’s behavior as the perfect excuse to bring Taylor to justice
before the Court .
A Chapter VII UN Security Council resolution would make the
job even easier for the politicians in view of the earlier exile deal. If the
Security Council acted under its coerc i ve Chapter VII authority and
ordered all member states to cooperate with the Special Court, including
turning over indictees on their territory, the Nigerians would have another way of justifying Taylor's turnover. They could also use such a re s o l ution as leverage to press Taylor to “voluntarily” turn himself in. Given
Taylor’s track record, that last scenario seems unlikely unless he adopts
the pose of a wronged victim who submitted himself to the Special Court
in order to further peace in Liberia.
Bringing Taylor to face the charges at the Special Court would send
an important message throughout the region. It would make it clear that
power does not buy immunity from charges for war crimes. It would set
an important precedent by holding a leader accountable for criminal
charges and demonstrate that leaders are subject to the law. It may also
have a deterrent effect on others who would use similar tactics to furt h e r
their personal goals, and who, based on the impunity that has reigned to
date, would otherwise not fear being held accountable before the law.
In short, options still exist that could bring Taylor before the Special
C o u rt and put him behind bars. And while the passage of time may make
it easier to take these steps, there is little good reason to wait. What is
most re q u i red is a level of will and backbone on the part of key West
African governments and the West (including the United States).
Whether that exists remains to be seen. But until that backbone is found
the stability of Liberia and the prospects for the rule of law in Liberia and
Sierra Leone will suffer. HRB
Kathy Ward is the Deputy Director of the Washington Office of the International
Crisis Group.
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